|
I woke up in a London hotel last Friday, sleep
deprived and just aching for some real American coffee. I nibbled my
black pudding with fried tomatoes and glanced at the Financial Times.
Milton Friedman had died.
Friedman is best known for his advocacy of
monetarism, a mistake that irrevocably associated him with the gyrating
interest rates of the early 1980's. We all make mistakes. Another of
Friedman’s mistakes was the time he sat on the Ph.D. examination
committee of one Harry Markowitz. He argued against granting the degree
on technical grounds.
Friedman made many valuable contributions in his
lifetime. For me, the most interesting was an article he penned in 1953
called the Methodology of Positive Economics. Drawing on 20th
century philosophy of science, he distinguished between a positive
science and a normative science. The former describes the way the world
is. The latter describes how it should be. A positive science is
descriptive. A normative science is prescriptive.
Philosophers of the Vienna Circle, and later Karl
Popper, explained that a positive science can be judged according to one
criteria: the accuracy of the predictions it makes. Science progresses
through the development of models (also called laws, theories or
hypothesis). These make predictions. Newton’s law of gravitation
predicts that, if we drop an apple, it will fall. Any number of
meteorological models predict that, if air pressure drops, there will be
a storm. We reject models that make poor predictions. We accept those
that make good predictions—at least until other models come along that
make better predictions.
Friedman advocated this outlook for economics. A
decade later, William Sharpe would grab it as a lifeline. He was trying
to get his capital asset pricing model (CAPM) published. Later, it would
win him a Nobel Prize, but Dudley Luckett, editor of the Journal of
Finance was refusing to publish it. Sharpe’s model assumed that all
investors hold identical beliefs about the expected values, standard
deviations and correlations of asset returns. Luckett found this so
preposterous as to render Sharpe’s model uninteresting.
Eventually, it would take a change of editorship at
the Journal of Finance to get the paper published. In the mean
time, Sharpe redrafted and resubmitted his paper a number of times. In
one of those redrafting, no doubt in exasperation, he included the
comment
Needless to say, these are highly restrictive and undoubtedly
unrealistic assumptions. However, since the proper test of a theory is
not the realism of its assumptions but the acceptability of its
implications, and since these assumptions imply equilibrium conditions
which form a major part of classical financial doctrine, it is far from
clear that this formulation should be rejected …
In my October 26 blog posting, I commented that
Basel and other regulatory requirements that require that value-at-risk
(VaR) be measured as, say, 10-day 99% VaR are ill-advised because such
numbers can’t be calculated in any meaningful way. Now let’s put that
assertion on solid theoretical ground.
Positive philosophy of science requires that models
be accepted or rejected based on the predictions they make. What
predictions does a VaR measure make? The VaR numbers a VaR measure spits
out are not predictions. Predictions have to be something we can
experience. Saying that a portfolio has a 90% probability of losing less
that $100,000 over the next day isn’t a prediction. The next day, when
the portfolio has realized a loss of $24,000, who is to say if the VaR
measure was “right” or “wrong?” We don’t experience probabilities. If
the weather forecast is for a 40% chance of rain, we aren’t going to
experience that 40% chance. We are either going to experience rain of
not rain.
What makes a VaR measure meaningful is our
backtesting of it. The backtest is the prediction. We run the VaR
measure for a period of time and predict that the results will perform
in some manner when backtested. If they do, we accept the VaR measure.
If they don’t, we reject the VaR measure. If the VaR measure addresses
risky events of such low frequency that backtesting is impossible, then
there is no prediction being made. Philosophically, the VaR measure is
meaningless.
Officially, banks do backtest their ten-day 99% VaR
measures. What they actually do is backtest a similar one-day 99% VaR
measure and argue that, if it passes the backtest, then the ten-day 99%
VaR measure extrapolated from it would also pass a backtest. Such
arguments are empty because they are making predictions about things
that cannot be experienced. We can never experience a ten-day 99% VaR
measure passing a reasonable backtest. Some model that states that, if a
one-day 99% VaR measure passes a backtest then so will a ten-day 99% VaR
measure, is wrong simply because the ten-day 99% VaR cannot be backtested.
The very notion that a ten-day 99% VaR measure can be “good” or “bad,”
“right” or “wrong,” “accurate” or “inaccurate,” are meaningless simply
because the VaR measure makes no predictions about anything that will be
experienced.
Karl Popper relates a story involving child
psychologist Alfred Adler:
As
for Adler, I was much impressed by a personal experience. Once, in 1919,
I reported to him a case which to me did not seem particularly Adlerian,
but which he found no difficulty in analyzing in terms of his theory of
inferiority feelings, although he had not even seen the child. Slightly
shocked, I asked him how he could be so sure. ‘Because of my
thousandfold experience’, he replied; whereupon I could not help saying:
‘And with this new case, I suppose, your experience has become
thousand-and-one-fold.’

Dr. Adler's theories made no predictions about
experiences that would allow us to accept or reject them. They were just
so many words—meaningless words without predictive content.
Popper's example illustrates how the positive
philosophy of science is not some abstract idea, far removed from
day-to-day scientific practice. It is our logical justification for
rejecting astrology while accepting astronomy. It is why we ignore
creation science and embrace Darwin’s theory of evolution. In the 20th
century, it forced a rethink of the methods used in various social
sciences. Friedman wrote his piece on positive economics in 1953 as a
part of those efforts.
The positive philosophy of science tells us that
ten-day 99% VaR, like Dr. Adler's theory of inferiority feelings, is
just so many words, devoid of predictive content. Both belong in the
same dubious camp as astrology and creation science. This is relevant
for more than VaR. Today, financial institutions, encouraged by
regulators, are constructing ever more elaborate models for economic
capital, portfolio credit risk and operational risk. They all sound very
scientific. They are all meaningless.
Are any regulators listening?
Glyn A. Holton
See
Glyn Holton's blog posting
The Trend is Your Friend: Value-at-Risk and Amaranth of October 26, 2006
|