|
Ask a practitioner of the origins of financial risk
management, and he might say
it emerged in response to financial blow-ups of the early 1990s. Or he
might say it emerged out of efforts by the Basel Committee to
standardize bank capital requirements globally. Or he might say it
emerged from efforts by banks to understand their own risks—RAROC and
RiskMetrics being the two most obvious initiatives. All these
explanations would have financial risk management emerging during the period 1985-1995. But
what exactly emerged?
For many years, I have defined
financial risk management as "the process whereby
an organization optimizes the manner in which it takes financial risk."
Note that it is not about optimizing risk; it is about optimizing the
manner in which risk is taken, but this is a topic for another posting.
For now, let's note that other definitions have been offered over the
years, but most tend to be as general as my own. There is little that
links them to the specific events of 1985-1995. Organizations have
struggled to optimize, in some sense, the manner in which they take
financial risk, for as long as they have faced financial risk. This
places the origins of
financial risk management in the shadows of prehistory.
Financial risk management would
include everything from installing cash registers that ring when the
drawer opens to credit analysis and the entire field of financial
accounting.
Processes for optimizing risk taking
have existed and evolved over millennia. What happened during 1985-1995
was that a new buzzword was applied to a body of techniques, some of
which were just emerging. It was the second time in 20 years that this
had happened. During 1975-1985, the new buzzword was asset-liability
management (ALM), which was applied to duration matching, gap analysis
and other related techniques. Now the buzzword was financial risk
management, and it was applied to value-at-risk (VaR), risk-adjusted
performance metrics (RAPMs) and still other related techniques.
ALM failed to prevent the Savings & Loan crisis. Based
on that track record, I would say that ALM has proven itself useful but
inadequate. The report card for financial risk management has been even worse. It failed to
prevent
the
Asian crisis
repeated
blow-ups at hedge funds, starting with LTCM
the
2000 stock market bubble
electricity
trading abuses that were, at least partly, responsible for bankrupting
PG&E and caused rolling blackouts in California
spectacular
corporate failures, including Enron and Worldcom
a
host of abuses at investment banks relating to equity analysts, IPOs and
bundling of loans with investment banking services
the
"market timing" scandal at mutual funds
the
executive stock option back-dating scandal.
This all transpired during the ten years following the
Group of 30 report and JP Morgan's introduction of RiskMetrics. Some
might conclude that
financial risk management has been an unmitigated disaster. I would
respond that things would have been worse without
financial risk management, but it is hard to
argue about hypotheticals. It is indisputable that, just as ALM proved
an inadequate solution, so has
. It either needs to be transformed or
supplemented with a new new buzzword and associated techniques.
Back in the mid-1990s,
financial risk management was the darling of Wall Street.
Banks embraced it as an industry alternative to proposed regulation of
the emerging OTC derivatives markets. That battle was won, and the OTC
derivatives markets avoided the feared regulation. No longer Wall
Street's darling,
financial risk management is mostly trotted out to help close derivatives
sales or to satisfy regulators. It is also embraced by third parties who
sell software, courses, books and such. Mostly, it has become an
unwanted "cost center." Thousands of bright, dedicated professionals
labor away in these cost centers, but they receive little acclaim form
those they serve. New ideas percolate into
financial risk management from bank regulatory
initiatives or financial engineering. Otherwise, innovation and debate
have largely dried up. The heady days of 1995 are long gone.
Today, I am launching a blog about risk generally and
about financial risk management specifically. My goal is to reignite innovation and debate. I
intend to be novel, provocative and even controversial. I am writing to
make a difference, but I will accomplish nothing without your
involvement. I hope you will join me. There is functionality for
commenting on my postings. Just click the comment button that appears at
the end of each posting. You can also reply to other people's comments
by clicking on the reply button that appears within each comment. I hope
to post about once a week. With your involvement, we should get quite a
discussion going.
The domain name for the blog is glynholton.com. I would
prefer to call it riskblog.com to be consistent with domain names of my
other websites. That particular domain name appears to be owned by the
folks at Goldman Sachs. They tried to set up a risk-related website
under that domain name a few years ago, but apparently lost interest. If
anyone works for Goldman or has contacts over there, please contact the
right people to see if they will give me the domain name. I think
riskblog.com is a nicer domain name than glynholton.com.
Glyn A. Holton
|

Disclaimer
website: http://www.contingencyanalysis.com
blog direct link: http://www.glynholton.com
copyright © Contingency Analysis, 2006 - current
 |
|
|