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In recent months, a number of studies have been
released addressing the question of whether burdensome US financial
regulations are making US financial markets less competitive—driving
fledgling corporations to go public in other, more lightly regulated
jurisdictions. The first study was released last November by a recently
formed Committee on Capital Markets Regulation (CCMR). Another study was
by mayor Bloomberg and Senator Schumer. A third was from the United
States Chamber of Commerce. Also, the American Enterprise Institute and
Brookings Institute recently held a joint conference focused on these
studies.
The studies and conference represent important
work, and their conclusions should be carefully weighed. Caution is also
necessary. A central observation of the CCMR study is the fact
that "5% of the value of global initial public offerings was raised in
the US last year, compared to 50% in 2000." This is a compelling
statistic, but what does it mean? Does it indicate a need for sweeping
reform of US regulations in order to make US financial markets more
competitive, or does it merely highlight a known problem with one
section of one existing US law? I am speaking, of course, of Section 404
of the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX).
SOX was a brief reversal in a prolonged dismantling
of US financial regulation. Consider that financial derivatives spread
in the 1980's as a massive end-run around a number of regulatory
safeguards. We spent much of the 1990s wondering what the regulatory
response might be. Aggressive lobbying ensured there was none. We
ushered in the new millennium by discarding the Glass-Steagal Act, which
had eliminated a variety of conflicts of interest from the capital
markets. Well, guess what? The conflicts of interest are back.
Compounding all this, in 1996, president Clinton signed the National
Securities Markets Improvement Act, dismantling parts of the venerable
1940 Act. Restrictions on unregulated investment funds were loosened,
paving the way for explosive growth in hedge funds and private equity
funds.
The CCMR study noted that "Private equity firms,
almost non-existent in 1980, sponsored more than $200 billion of capital
commitments last year alone." It goes on to suggest that "The dramatic
increase in the use of private US markets is important evidence that
regulation and litigation are contributing to the flight of many
companies from the public market." This is not what recent history tells
us. If Congress and president Clinton hadn't gutted parts of the 1940
Act, private equity funds would hardly exist. They have flourished, not
because US regulations have been too burdensome, but because a
particular US law was weakened.
When it comes to debates, how a debate is framed
often determines how that debate concludes. You can imagine where a
debate about whether US financial regulations make US financial markets
uncompetitive is likely to lead. If we slash our regulatory safeguards
in the name of US competitiveness, other nations will do the same. The
result will be a "race to the bottom" in which nations compete over who
has the flimsiest regulations.
A similar race to the bottom occurred in the
1800's, when US states competed over which would have the weakest
incorporation laws. Delaware won the race, and that state has dominated
US incorporations since. That particular gutting of regulations
contributed to problems with corporate governance, which we are still
dealing with today.
During the 1990's, international bank regulators
avoided a race to the bottom in banking regulation when they
implemented the international Basel accords.
These set minimal banking regulatory requirements that have more or less
been accepted worldwide. The minimal requirements meant there was no
race to the bottom, and everyone benefited. A similar international
accord would be one way to avoid a race to the bottom on corporate
finance regulation.
The scandalous headlines of 2001-2002 have abated,
but the underlying problem of corporate governance remains. Owners of
corporations have lost control to managers who, in the 1932 words of
Berle and Means, "employ the proxy machinery to become a self
perpetuating body, even though as a group they own but a small fraction
of the stock outstanding."
The recent studies on US financial regulation have
highlighted the important role that shareholder rights must play in a
successful financial system, and they rightly call for market-based
solutions. Last November, I published an article in the Financial
Analysts Journal proposing a market-based solution that would
address the crusty problem of managers unaccountable to shareholders.
The idea is to revamp the proxy machinery by implementing a "proxy
exchange." This would allow shareholders to transfer their voting rights
to anyone—an uncle, a charity, a union, a financial advisor, a
faith-based organization—anyone willing to accept them.
The solution would, first of all, be simple. A
working mom might transfer all her current and future voting
rights—rights she owns directly or indirectly through a brokerage
account, mutual funds and pension plans—using a free, secure website. It
would take a single mouse click, and she would be done. What is more,
she wouldn't have to be a financial expert or have to research any
confusing proxy materials. She would simply transfer the rights to
someone she trusted. She could make her selection once and never need to
change it. But she could always change it later, if she wanted.
Suppose the woman transferred her rights to her
uncle. What would he do with them? Well, he would be in the same
position as the woman. Like her, he would have an account on the
exchange. This would hold all his voting rights as well as the voting
rights the woman has transferred to him. With a single mouse click, he
could transfer all the voting rights to anyone he chose.
In this way, the proxy exchange would facilitate the
aggregation of voting rights. Small blocks of rights would be aggregated
into medium blocks. Medium blocks would be aggregated into large blocks.
Unlike the present model of corporate governance, where large blocks of
voting rights inevitably fall in the laps of corporate managers (or
occasionally corporate raiders), those large blocks would end up in the
laps of institutions whose interests are more aligned with the
financial, environmental, political and ethical concerns of the ultimate
shareholders. No longer would corporate managers be a "self-perpetuating
body." The problem of corporate governance would be transformed.
If you have not already done so, please take a look
at my
paper, which describes the concept in greater detail. If you have
comments or questions, please post them here for others to read.
Finally, if you believe in the idea of a proxy exchange—or would just
like to see it debated in a wider forum, there is an opportunity to help
out. The SEC is planning to host three roundtables on proxy voting this
month, and they have solicited comments from the general public. I have
already submitted my paper to them. Please add your voice to mine by
submitting your own endorsement of, or comments on the concept of a
proxy exchange. The SEC has set up a special
webpage
for you to do so. Thank you.
Glyn A. Holton
Read
a summary of the CCMR study. (all quotes taken from this summary.)
Read
the CCMR study.
Read
Glyn Holton's paper proposing a global proxy exchange.
Read
about the SEC's planned roundtables on the proxy process.
Submit
your own comments to the SEC for the upcoming roundtables.
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