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In his new book Accidental Investment Banker,
Jonathan Knee introduces us to the phrase IBG YBG, which means "I'll be
gone. You'll be gone." This might be whispered between investment
bankers when an inconvenient fact comes to light during due diligence on
a company they are about to float. "Don't sweat it" is the implication.
Investors may be burned. The investment bank itself may be burned, but
by then, the bankers themselves will have cashed their bonuses and be
long gone.
IBG YBG comes up all too often in financial risk
management. This past week, an inexperienced risk manager posted to the
forum riskchat.com to get advice on how to deal with a options
trader who's portfolio is so huge and convoluted that he can't perform
basic analyses on it. The risk manager isn't provided essential tools to
perform his job, and the trader refuses to work with him.
For anyone who has worked in risk management a few
years, the situation sounds familiar. It has IBG YBG written all over
it. The novice risk manager doesn't tell us what firm he works for.
Let's suppose it is a hedge fund. Hedge fund managers routinely pay
themselves 2% of assets plus 20% of profits annually. On a multi-billion
dollar fund, that could easily amount to $100 million a year. What do
managers care if a trader's activities or reported profits are
questionable? IBG YBG. The managers just have to hang in there for a
year or two, and they will all retire multi-millionaires. Why
investigate? Instead, they can hire a novice risk manager, don't support
him, don't give him resources, and don't back him up when he complains
he can't get answers from a trader. Plausible deniability; look the
other way; IBG YBG—it's all the same thing. As long as they can avoid
actual fraud, managers will be safely out of the way when investors are
picking up the pieces.
The 1995 Barings debacle was a classic case of IBG
YBG. Managers loved the bonuses they were earning due to Leeson's
reported earnings, and they were careful not to investigate the hundreds
of millions of pounds they were sending him in Singapore to cover margin
calls. The Joseph Jett affair also reeked of IBG YBG.
Enron was a case of IBG YBG in which—and this
happens often—managers went beyond avoiding explicit fraud and started
engaging in fraud so long as they felt it wouldn't be discovered. Things
got out of hand.
Risk managers tend to distinguish between market
risk, credit risk, operational risk and liquidity risk. I guess we could
add IBG YBG risk to the list, but this would be misleading. Market,
credit, operational and liquidity risk, more often than not, are just
symptoms of IBG YBG risk. Firms that run on IBG YBG are the ones that
suffer crippling losses due to market, credit, operational or liquidity
risk. At well run firms, IBG YBG isn't a factor. Those firms monitor
market, credit, operational and liquidity risks, but they aren't going
to suffer crippling losses from them. In such firms, these risks aren't
so much risks as they are details to be monitored and managed in a
professional manner. Only at IBG YBG firms is there a real risk of
things blowing up.
This isn't news for experienced risk managers. I am
just putting words to what is common knowledge.
IBG YBG risk often is an issue with
low-probability, high-impact risks. Responsible parties may ignore such
risks, hoping to be long gone by the time a crisis
actually hits. Studies indicated that New Orleans would fill up like a
soup bowl if it were directly hit by a major hurricane. Politicians
didn't fund the expensive levy work that was required because, well, you
figure it out ...
Economists have their own terminology for IBG YBG.
For them it is a type of "agency problem"—the problem that in a
principal-agent relationship, the agent is likely to pursue his own
interests instead of those of the principal. The agency problem exists
between government officials and their electorate. It exists between
corporate managers and shareholders. In that context, the solution
economists often turn to is improved corporate governance.
Financial risk management, as it is practiced
today, is powerless to address IBG YBG. Where IBG YBG reigns, risk
managers (if they exist at all) report to managers involved in the IBG
YBG. No, a better solution is corporate governance, and this is why
serious discussions of risk management so often become discussions of
corporate governance. I will discuss that in my next posting.
Glyn A. Holton
See
Jonathan Knee's book Accidental Investment Banker.
See
the discussion thread about the novice risk manager.
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